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Peace and the Press: Media Rules

During U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
ABSTRACT

In recent years, U.N. peacekeeping operations have
become an increasingfocus of international military action
and media coverage. While the military and the media have
maintaineda precariousbalance in the United States between
the military's objective of operationalsuccess and the media's
call for uncensored reporting, the evolution and growing
importance of U.N. peacekeeping offers new considerations to
this balance. This Note examines the ability of the United
Nations to affect the balance between the military and the
media through the implementation of U.N. media rules during
peacekeeping operations. This Note begins by reviewing the
history of media coverage of U.N. peacekeeping and
discussing the internationalconventions addressingfreedom
of expression and thefreeflow of information. Next, the Note
examines both the United Nation's ability to restrictthe media
during peacekeeping operations and the interests of the
United Nations and the media concerning such restrictions.
The Note continues by proposing that the United Nations
establish media rules for peacekeeping operations which
balance the respective roles of the United Nations and the
media. Finally, the Note concludes that to be effective, U.N.
media rules must not only limit media coverage when
necessary for operational success, but must also have the
support of the media and the participatingmember states in
each peacekeeping operation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout U.S. history, the military and the media have
maintained a precarious balance between the military's desire for
operational security and the media's call for access to military
Recently, however, the
operations and uncensored reporting.'
military has altered this balance by restricting the access of the

1.

For a more detailed history and analysis of this balance in U.S.

military-press relations, see Michael D. Steger, Slicing the Gordlan Knotb

A

Proposalto Reform Military Regulation of Media Coverage of Combat Operations, 28
U.S.F. L. REv. 957 (1994). For a general overview of war time reporting, see PETER
BRAESTRUP, BIG STORY (Yale Univ. Press ed., 1983) (1977); JOSEPH J. MATHEWS,
REPORTING THE WARS (1957); WARTIME CENSORSHIP OF PRESS AND RADIO (Robert E.

Summers ed., H.W. Wilson Co. 1942).

For a comprehensive history of U.S.

journalism, see FRANK LUTHER MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM-A HISTORY:
1960 (3rd ed. 1962).

1690-
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While much
media to the coverage of military operations.2
discussion and debate has occurred over the constitutionality of
these restrictions and the power of the U.S. government to impose
them,3 there has been little discussion of the fact that these
the context of
recent media restrictions have taken place within
4
United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations.
During the 1990s, U.N. peacekeeping operations have been
the primary impetus of U.S. military action.5 These operations
have responded to aggression in the Persian Gulf, intervened in
humanitarian emergencies in Somalia, and attempted to negotiate
Although U.N. peacekeeping operations
peace in Bosnia.6
generally consist of multinational coalitions, these military
operations have not been under U.N. command, but rather have
been under the direction of an individual state, most notably the
United States. 7 The U.N. Security Council, however, mandates
these operations and allocates the responsibility of conducting
these operations to member states.' Therefore, media restrictions

2.
During the Persian Gulf campaign, the U.S. Pentagofs media policy
included military press pools for an unspecified duration and a military "security
review" of all news reports. John E. Smith, From the FrontLines to the FrontPage:
Media Access to War in the PersianGulf and Beyond, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.

291,301 (1993).
Compare Paul G. Cassell, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Mlltary
3.
Operations: The Right of Access, Grenada,and "Off-the-Record Wars," 73 GEo. L.J.
931 (1985) (arguing that press restrictions during Grenada invasion did not
violate First Amendment) with Frank B. Cross & Stephen M. Griffin, A Right of
PressAccess to United States Military Operations,21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 989 (1987)
(arguing that the press' constitutional right of access was violated by press
restrictions during the Grenada invasion).
4.
In this Note, "peacekeeping" refers to U.N. authorized military missions
under the command of individual states established to enforce U.N. decisions
concerning the preservation of international peace. U.N. peacekeeping efforts
include preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict
peace-building. See infra Part IV.B. Since 1990, the Security Council has
adopted fifty-eight Chapter VII resolutions authorizing peacekeeping operations.
Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective
Security After the Cold War, 32 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 201, 207 n.2 (1994) (citing
Oscar Schatcter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 n.30 (1994)).
5.
U.N. peacekeeping, while not originally envisioned in the U.N. Charter,
has evolved over the last 40 years as an internationally acceptable technique for
controlling conflicts and promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes. Ingrid A.
Lehmann, Public Perceptions of U.N. Peacekeeping: A Factor in the Resolution of
International Conflicts, 19 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 109, 110 (1995). For an
overview of the history of U.N. peacekeeping and current operations, see A.B.
FETHERSTON, TOWARDS A THEORY OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING (1994).
6.
Lehmann. supra note 5, at 109.
7.
Murphy, supranote 4, at 222-23.
8.
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter grants members of the United Nations
the authority to settle disputes. Article 39 of Chapter VII empowers the Security
Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression." Under Article 42, the Security Council may order
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during U.N. peacekeeping operations may arise from a U.N.
mandate, rather than the U.S. military.
This Note will examine the ability of the United Nations to
affect the balance between the military and the media within the
peacekeeping context. Part II of this Note describes the history of
media coverage of U.N. peacekeeping missions. Part III discusses
freedom of expression and the free flow of information in
international law. Part IV examines whether the United Nations
has the ability to restrict media coverage of peacekeeping
missions. Part V discusses the interests of the United Nations
and those of the media concerning media coverage and
restrictions. Part VI proposes that the United Nations establish
media rules when it authorizes a peacekeeping operation. This
Note concludes that the United Nations may restrict media
coverage of its peacekeeping missions when necessary to further
their operational security and success, but that to be effective,
these restrictions must have the support of the media and those
member states participating in the operation.

II. HISTORY OF MEDIA COVERAGE OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

A. From Early PeacekeepingEfforts to the PersianGulf War
U.N. peacekeeping had its origins with the creation of the
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) at the
end of the first Arab-Israeli war in June of 1948. 9
UNTSO
organized and deployed U.N. military observers in conflict areas to
supervise ceasefires or armistice agreements.' 0
Limited to a
supervisory role, these early U.N. peacekeeping efforts were
unarmed."
Armed U.N. peacekeeping efforts and significant media
coverage of these operations began in 1950 with the Korean
War. 12 At first, journalists had broad access to the front lines
and censorship was informal, with "only a voluntary code of war

members of the United Nations to use force against a noncompliant country, and
Article 43 authorizes the Security Council to require armed forces, assistance,
and facilities from member states. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39,42, 43, para. 1.
9.

F.T. LIu, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND THE NON-USE OF FORCE 13

(1992).
10.
11.
continues
12.

Id.
Id. UNTSO is the longest existing U.N. military observer mission and
its operation today. Id. at 15.
Smith, supranote 2. at 297.

1997

MEDIA RULES DURING U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

139

reporting aimed at preserving military secrets." 13 However, as
U.N. losses increased, the U.S. military imposed a formal system
of censorship. 1 4 Even under formal censorship, journalists'
access to coverage and reporting was not severely limited. 15
In the years following the Korean conflict, the United Nations
led several peacekeeping missions involving large-scale
humanitarian programs, comprehensive information programs,
and negotiations to end regional wars in Afghanistan and the
Middle East. 16 Media attention during this time concerned the
image development of the United Nations. 17 However, diplomats
generally discouraged press coverage of negotiations-inprogress,' 8 and program planning and development lacked the
headline-grabbing character of international hostilities. Media
restrictions, therefore, were not an issue during this period.
In 1988, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to U.N.
peacekeeping operations demonstrated the world's recognition of
these operations as an important development in the
international community since World War f.19 Moreover, the

period since 1988 has been the most active regarding such
operations in peacekeeping history. 20

With this recognition and

an unprecedented expansion of the exercise of these operations in
the last decade, 2 1 U.N. peacekeeping operations have attracted
significant media attention in recent years.
In the late 1980s and the beginning of 1990, U.N.
peacekeeping operations in Namibia, Central America, and

13.

PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY, THE FIRST CASUALTY-FROM THE CRIMEA TO VIETNAM:

THE WAR CORRESPONDENT AS HERO. PROPAGANDIST, AND MYTH MAKER 337 (1975).
14.
Id. at 345-56.
15.
PETER BRAESTRUP, BATTLE LINES: BACKGROUND PAPER 59-60 (1985).
16.
Lehmann,supranote 5, at 113. These missions included among others:
the United Nations Emergency Force Operated in Egypt and Israel in 1956 (UNEF
I), United Nations Operation in the Congo in 1960 (ONUC), United Nations Force
in Cyprus in 1964 (UNFICYP), United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in
the Golan Heights in 1974 (UNDOF), and United Nations Interim Force in
Lebanon in 1978 (UNIFIL). FETHERSTON, supra note 5. at 17-18, 233.
17.
Lehmann, supranote 5. at 113.
18.
Id. at 112.
19.
Id.at 110.
20.
FETHERSTON, supra note 5, at 25. According to Fetherston, several
general characteristics distinguish this "Expansion Period" from earlier
peacekeeping. First is the "cooperative superpower dimension" in the Security
Council and U.N. activities. Second, each conflict has involved significant internal
and regional dimensions. Third, with the change in attitude of the former Soviet
Union toward U.N. peacekeeping, the role of the Secretary-General in the day-today running of operations is seen as a positive situation and is receiving much
more support from the entire Council. Id.
21.
Lehmann, supra note 5, at 110-11. By the end of 1993, there were
approximately 72.000 persons active in 18 peacekeeping operations, only five of
which began prior to the end of the Cold War. Murphy, supra note 4, at 220.
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Cambodia involved the implementation of international peace
accords, agreed upon by the target parties and the international
community. 22 In recent years, however, U.N. peacekeeping in
Somalia, the Persian Gulf, and Bosnia has required military
enforcement of U.N. mandates.
It is in these three U.N.
peacekeeping missions that the question of media restrictions has
come into controversy and debate.
B. The PersianGulf War
The Persian Gulf War 2 3 provides an instructive illustration of
the tension between the media and the military during modem
U.N. peacekeeping operations. While Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm were U.N. authorized missions, 2 4 U.S. military
involvement was substantial and, in effect, determinative of the
strategy and implementation of U.N. mandates. The United
Nations did not place any formal restrictions on media coverage of
the conflict. However, after months of negotiations between the
Pentagon and media organizations, 2 5 the U.S. military instituted a
system of press pools, military escorts, limited access, and

reporting reviews. 26 According to the Pentagon, such guidelines

were implemented for national security, 2 7 and more specifically,
to prevent the media from jeopardizing military operations and
28
endangering lives.

22.
Lehmann, supranote 5, at 117.
23.
On January 16, 1991, the forces of a U.N. Coalition attacked both Iraqi
forces in Kuwait and military targets in Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait. Marianne D. Short & Jodene Pope, History and Scope of the Press' Right
ofAccess to ForeignBattlefields, 41 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (1993), available in WESTLAW,
NAVLR Database.
24.
In Resolution 678, the Security Council authorized member states to
.use all necessary means to uphold and implement" the Security Council's
resolutions (which included the order that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait) and to
.restore international peace and security in the area." S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR,
45th Sess., 2963rd mtg., at 64-65, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
25.
Steger, supra note 1, at 972; see also Jason DeParle, After the War
Long Series of Military DecisionsLed to Gulf War News Censorship, N.Y. TIMES, May
5, 1991, at SI.
26.
Steger, supra note 1, at 972. On January 7, 1991. the U.S. Department
of Defense issued lists of "releasable and unreleasable" material, along with
procedures for "security reviews" and interviews. Three times in two weeks, these
instructions were revised with guidelines concerning press pools and updated
lists of "unreleasable" material. Michael W. Klein, The Censor's Red Flair, the
Bombs Bursting In Air: The Constitutionalityof the Desert Storm Media Restrictions,
19 HAsTiNGs CONsT. L.Q. 1037, 1038-39 n.5 (1992) (citing Nation Magazine v.
United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1575-78, 1580-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (apps. A, B, C, and E)).
27.
Smith, supranote 2, at 292.
28.
Id. at 302-03 n.54.
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The military was particularly concerned with the
instantaneous transmission of television broadcasts. 29 The speed
and accuracy with which television could communicate troop
locations and battle images, and the ability of enemy forces to
monitor the Cable News Network (CNN) and other U.S. broadcast
media, added new dimensions to the power and danger of the
news media. 30 As one commentator suggests, the Persian Gulf
War was a "production of the news media conglomerate [where]..
. the boundaries between military action and media event broke
down in such a way that military planning could become a new
form of media reality."3 t Because of these considerations, the
U.S. military justified restricting press
access and reviewing
32
reports before television broadcasting.
There were further considerations that impacted the
relationship between the media and military in the Persian Gulf.
First, the Saudi Arabian government controlled access into Saudi
Arabia. 3 3 As the host country for the peacekeeping operation,
Saudi Arabia determined the number of reporters who could enter
the region.
Thus, the U.S. government, while exerting
considerable influence on its Saudi host, claimed Saudi demands
as another reason that the military required an escort system for
journalists. 3 4 This system required that a press member had to
remain with a military escort at all times and follow the escort's
35
instructions.
Second, the military established an accreditation system that
required journalists to agree to ground rules in order to be

29.
Steger, supra note 1, at 972 (citing Matthew J. Jacobs, Assessing the
Constitutionalityof PressRestrictions in the Persian Gulf War, 44 STAN. L. REV. 675,
694 (1992)).
30.
Steger, supra note 1, at 972. In his keynote address at the United
States Institute of Peace Conference on "Managing Chaos," Ted Koppel recalled
walking down the hall of the Iraqi foreign ministry a few days before the beginning
of Operation Desert Storm and noticing that every office had a television tuned to
CNN. Koppel further stated that he suspected that "if a colleague had walked
down the appropriate corridors at the State Department, the CIA or the Pentagon
at the same moment, they too would have found televisions in corresponding
offices tuned to CNN." Ted Koppel, The Global Information Revolution and TV
News, 11, 12 in KEYNOTE ADDRESSES FROM THE "MANAGING CHAOS" CONFERENCE (U.S.
Institute of Peace 1995) [hereinafter MANAGING CHAOS].
31.
Tom Engelhardt, The Gulf War as Total Television, 254 THE NATION 613
(1992) available In LEXIS, News Library, Nation File.
32.
Steger, supranote 1, at 973.
33.
Id. at 973.
34.
Id. at 973. For further explanation of the military's rationale concerning
Saudi control of access, see Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dept of Defense, 762 F. Supp.
1558, 1577 app. C (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

35.

Klein, supra note 26, at 1050.
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accredited.3 6
These rules consisted of prohibitions on the
identification of casualties, description of future military plans,
identification of units or bases, description of specific methods of
37
Most of
operation, and provision of other types of information.
the rules, however, were standard restrictions that U.S. reporters
38
had adhered to in the past.
Third, the military implemented a pool system that served to
limit the number of correspondents in combat areas. 39 The
military granted pool membership based upon affiliation with a
media organization Ibecause of the extensive media presence in
the Arabian Gulf, the fact that some media organizations are
represented by many individuals, and the likelihood that more
organizations and individuals will arrive in the future."40 Within
the pool, correspondents shared their information and work
product among all of the pool members. 4 1 Non-pool members
were restricted from the combat zone and risked violating local
security measures. 4 2 As the war advanced, however, the military
expanded the number of pools from eleven to twenty-five,
permitting 200 reporters to accompany the troops in the invasion
43
of Kuwait.
Finally, the military reviewed reports before their release and
enacted various forms of news blackouts. 44 Initially, U.S. Defense
Secretary Dick Cheney imposed a complete news blackout
because of the dangers reporting may have posed to the Allied
46
The complete blackout was eventually lifted.
forces.4 5
Blackouts also included limited information on casualties and

36.
Steger, supranote 1, at 973; see also Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at
1575-82 apps. A-E.
37.
Steger, supranote 1. at 973; see also Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at
1575-82 apps. A-E.
38.
Steger, supranote 1,at 973.
39.
Id. at 973-74.
40.
Nation Magazine,762 F.Supp. at 1578-80 app. D.
41.
Klein, supra note 26, at 1049.
42.
Id. According to Guidelines for News Media (January 14, 1991):
News media personnel who are not of the official... media pools will not
be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from
attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders
will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and
will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.
Nation Magazine, 762 F.Supp. at 1577 app. C (reprint).
43.
Klein,supra note 26,at 1049.
44.
Steger, supranote 1,at 974-75.
45.
Id. at 976; see also Richard L. Berke, War In the GuYf. The Press: News
from Gulf Is Good, and Cheney's Press Curbs Are Loosened, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
1991. at Al7.
46.
Steger, supranote 1,at 976.
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damage in Iraq.4 7 Due to the prior review requirement, U.S. news
reports were prefaced by the phrase, "Reports reviewed by
military censors."48 In addition, the military's direct briefings
49
failed to provide any additional information about the conflict.
The media protested these restrictions, particularly the
system of military escorts and the implementation of press
pools. 50

The press claimed that both the escorts and pools

5
limited reporting by excluding the press from areas of interest. 1
In addition, the press asserted that the military discriminated in
media pools membership.5 2 According to the press, the military
favored those media organizations that had a long-term presence
military operations over
of covering Department of Defense
53
"alternative" media organizations.

C. Beyond the PersianGulf War

In 1993, the U.N. Operation in Somalia 5 4 commenced to help
guarantee the safe transport of food to Somalians.5 5 Because the
Pentagon had informed the media where and when troops would
be arriving in Somalia, the lighting used by media on a Somalian
beach blinded U.S. Navy SEALS and Marines and made the
arriving troops an easy target for snipers.5 6 In spite of this initial
conflict between the media and the military, the U.S. military did
not place the type of restrictions upon the media as it did during
the Persian Gulf operation. 57 However, in response to Somali
aggression, the Defense Department activated a coverage pool for

47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 974. The military and media were in general agreement on the
rules for publication. Of 1351 print pool reports, only five were appealed to the
Pentagon for review. Eventually, four were approved and printed and the fifth
was changed after consultations with the reporter's editor. Id. (citing Pete
Williams, View from the Pentagon: Let's Face It This Was the Best War Coverage
We've Ever Had, WASH. POST. March 17, 1991, at Dl).
49. Steger, supranote 1, at 976.
Id. at 973-74; see also Kevin P. Kenealey, The Persian Gulf War and the
50.
Press: Is There a ConstitutionalRight ofAccess to Military Operations?,87 Nw. U. L.
REv. 287, 290 (1992).
Steger, supra note 1 at 974.
51.
Id. at 977.
52.
53.
Id. (citing Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1578).
FETHERSTON, supra note 5, at 235.
54.
Smith, supra note 2, at 305.
55.
Debra Gersh, It's Hollyuwl No, It's Somali! Military Leaders Question
56.
Massive Media-Presence Landing of U.S. Armed Forces, but Media Say Pentagon
EncouragedIt, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Dec. 19, 1992, at 9.
Smith, supra note 2. at 305.
57.
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ten days.5 8 While the Defense Department stated that "open and
independent reporting" should guide news coverage of military
operations, it further emphasized that the military must restrict
media access
when the security of the troops or operation is a
9
5

factor.

Such safety concerns have also prompted media restrictions
by the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)6 0 and by
the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former
Yugoslavia.6 1 However, these restrictions were not part of the
U.N. peacekeeping mandate, but rather, were implemented by
and UNPROFOR in charge of the
military commanders of UNTAC
62
U.N. peacekeeping operations.
While the United Nations has never formally restricted the
media during peacekeeping operations, the concerns over
restrictions imposed by the U.S. military and other national
military commanders during these operations are applicable to
the role of the United Nations in the relationship between the
media and the military during peacekeeping operations.
Operational security and success are at the heart of U.N.

peacekeeping

efforts.

The media,

however,

also has a

responsibility to provide the world with accurate and current
information about the military operations in which its nations are
engaged. With every restriction imposed on the media, the
possibility exists that the military and the media will be in
opposition at a time when cooperation is needed to ensure the
safety of both the military and reporters. Therefore, before
advising the United Nations to restrict the media during Its
peacekeeping operations, one must consider the many relevant
international policies and agreements.

Steven McClellan, Hot Spots Keep Network News Operations Hopping:
58.
Pool Coverage System in Somalia Criticized, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 15, 1993,
at 36.

59.

Id.

60.
Nate Thayer, Moaners Beware: Harassed U.N. Reacts to Negative Press
Assessment, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 5, 1992. at 27. UNTAC asserted that the
directive restricting the media's access to U.N. employees was necessary to
ensure the implementation of the peace plan in Cambodia. Id.
61.
U.N. Peacekeepers Keep the Press Out, TIME, May 23, 1994, at 18

[hereinafter U.N. Peacekeepers]. UNPROFOR restricted the media's access to

certain areas in order to avoid "inflam[ing] local passions." Id.
62.

Thayer, supranote 60, at 27; U.N. Peacekeepers,supra note 61, at 18.

19971

MEDIA RULES DURING U.N. PEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS

145

III. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

In the international world, there is no equivalent of the U.S.
Constitution's First Amendment guaranteeing the freedom of
However, several international
expression and the press.
conventions provide insight regarding a universal standard
concerning freedom of expression and the free flow of information.
Taken as a whole, these agreements suggest that freedom of
expression and the free flow of information are rights limited only
63
by national sovereignty.
A. U.N. Charterand the UNESCO Constitution
The U.N. Charter and the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Constitution
advocate principles that imply a freedom of expression and
information. 64 The U.N. Charter states in Article 1 that the
United Nations seeks "[tlo achieve international cooperation ... in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
Article 55 encourages a
fundamental freedoms for all."65
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and

fundamental freedoms.

'66

The UNESCO Constitution refers

explicitly to the right of expression by pledging that the
organization will "recommend such international agreements as
may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and
image." 67
"Every member state of the United Nations and
UNESCO has pledged support for these . . . documents which"
articulate the U.N. policy of recognizing, if not actively enforcing,

63.

See Amit Mukherjee, International Protection of Journalists: Problems,

Practice, and Prospects, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 339, 354 (1994) ("[In the
international communications regime, free flow of information doctrine is the
reigning orthodoxy[.]"); Michael J. Farley, Comment, Conflicts Over Government

Control of Information-The United States and UNESCO, 59 TUL. L. REv. 1071,
1087 (1985). See generally David A. Cifrino, Press Freedom in Latin America and
the Emerging International Right to Communicate, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 117
(1989).
64.
See generally THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY
(Bruno Simma et al. Eds. 1994) for a detailed history and analysis of the U.N.
Charter. See generally C. ANTHONY GIFFARD, UNESCO AND THE MEDIA (1989) and
UNESCO, UNESCO ON THE EVE OF ITS FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY (1985) for a general
history of UNESCO. For an analysis of the relationship between the United States
and UNESCO, see generally WILLIAM PRESTON, JR. ET AL., HOPE & FOLLY: THE
UNITED STATES AND UNESCO 1945-1985 (1989).
65.
U.N. CHARTER art 1. para. 3.
66.
U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
67.
UNESCO CONST. art. 1,§ 2(a), reprinted in 4 U.N.T.S. 275, 278.
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the freedom of expression68and the free flow of information in the
international communty.
B. The Universal Declarationof Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by
the U.N. General Assembly in 1948.69 The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights specifically guarantees freedom of expression
and information. Article 19 states, "Everyone has the right to

freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless
of frontiers."70 While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
is not legally binding, it is still an authoritative statement by the
international community recognizing the right to expression and
the free flow of information.
C. The InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(hereinafter "International Covenant") contains language very
similar to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Article 19 of the International Covenant provides that
"[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression."7 ' The
International Covenant, which is binding upon all states which
are party to the document, was "[u]nanimously approved by the
[U.N.] General Assembly in 1966, and subsequently adopted by
over seventy nations." 72 The International Covenant, however,
does not provide for freedom of expression in absolute terms, as
member states are allowed to impose restrictions "[flor the
Farley, supranote 63. at 1087.
68.
The U.N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights was intended to be a
69.
first step toward an International Bill of Rights. See Cinfino, supra note 63, at
117 (citing M. Gross, InternationalLaw Aspects of the Freedom of Information and
the Right to Communicate. in P. HORTON, THE THIRD WORLD AND PRESS FREEDOM 59
(1978)).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217 A. U.N. Doc.
70.
A/810, at 71. Art. 19 (1948).
71.
Article 19 of the International Covenant states:
Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
1.
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
2.
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess.. Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
Farley, supranote 63, at 1086.
72.
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protection of national security or of public order . . . ."73 The
International Covenant is nevertheless a legally binding
agreement to promote the free flow of expression and information.
D. HelsinkiAccords and Geneva Conventions

In 1975, thirty-five nations adopted the Helsinki Accords,
providing for the "Improvement

of Working Conditions

for

Journalists." 74 These nations proclaimed the right of journalists

to gather news without restraint and pledged "to facilitate the

freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to
encourage cooperation [sic] in the field of information and the
exchange of information with other countries. ..
75
The
agreement, however, is not a legally binding treaty.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are legally binding treaties
that include provisions concerning journalists. 76 The provisions,
however, are activated only during times of war. 7 7 Article 79 of
the Geneva Conventions Protocol I permits the issuance of
identification cards to journalists, but does not mandate that
states implement a requirement that journalists procure such a
78
card during a time of war.
E. Regional Agreements
Several regional agreements also provide sources of
international law concerning freedom of expression. 79 In Latin
America, the American Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter
"American Convention"), which is binding upon signing parties,
contains language similar to the International Covenant,
including a restriction on individual rights for the protection of

73.

InternationalCovenanton Civil and PoliticalRights, art. 19, § 3, supra note

71, at 55.
74.
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1,
1975, reprintedIn 14 I.L.M. 1292. 1317 (1975).
75.
Id.at 1315.
76.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
See generally Cifrino, supra note 63, at 128-29; see also Mukherjee,
supranote 63, at 354-62.
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Article 13 of the American

Convention, entitled "Freedom of Thought and Expression,"

expressly states that "[elveryone has the right to freedom of
thought and expression."8

1

Article 13 further provides that the

right of expression may not be restricted by "censorship"8

2

or

"indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or
private controls over newsprint .... information, or by any other
means tending to impede
the communication and circulation of
83
ideas and opinions."
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man is
a another statement of international law in the Western
Hemisphere. 8 4 Article IV provides that "[e]very person has the
right to freedom of investigation, of opinion, and of the expression
and dissemination of ideas, by any medium whatsoever." 8 5 The
Inter-American Conference on Human Rights in 1981 furthered
this concept of freedom of expression and information:
Freedom of Expression is universal and (its concept
embodies the legal rights of all] persons, individually or collectively
.... to express, transmit and [disseminate] their thoughts ...
freedom [to become informed] is also universal and [entails] the
collective [right] of [individuals] to receive [the] information
[communicated to them by others] without any interference [that
86
might distort].

However, while recognizing the right to freedom of expression,
the American Convention as well as the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(hereinafter "European Convention")8 7 and the Banjul Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights in Africa (hereinafter "Banjul
Charter"),8 8 limit the breadth of that freedom.
All three

80.
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 13, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, 149, 9 I.L.M. 673, 679 (1970) (entered into force July 18, 1978)

[hereinafter American Convention].
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948,
O.A.S. OFFICAL RECORDS, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979). reprinted in
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.65, doc. 6, at 17
(1985).
85.
Id. at 20.
86.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

1980-81, at 121 (1981) (English version).
87.
[European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept.
3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention].
88.
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June
27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59
[hereinafter Banjul Charter].
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international agreements classify freedom of expression as a right
upon which restrictions may be placed, even when the
restrictions are not necessitated by an emergency.89
The
American Convention requires that the restriction be "expressly
established by law."90
The European Convention allows for
91
restrictions upon freedom of expression "prescribed by law."
Similarly, the Banjul Charter provides that an individual's right
to
92
express and disseminate an opinion must be "within the law."
A restriction on the freedom of expression must involve one of
the objectives expressly enumerated in the international
agreement. The following four objectives are common to the three
agreements:
respect for the rights or reputation of others,
national security, public order and safety, and the protection of
public health and morals. 93
The American Convention also
includes propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial, or
religious hatred that constitute incitement to discrimination,
hostility, or violence as valid grounds for restrictions. 94 Interests
of territorial integrity, prevention of disorder or crime, prevention
of the disclosure of information received in confidence, and the
maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary are
additional grounds for restrictions according to the European

Convention. 95

The Banjul Charter is less precise as to other

grounds for restrictions, but it affirms that the rights of
individuals shall be exercised with due regard to the common
interest, social and national solidarity, territorial integrity, and
the promotion and achievement of African unity.96 Thus, all three
of these international agreements provide for freedom of
expression, but subject that right to restrictions provided by law
that have the following as an objective: respect for the rights of
others, national security, public order or safety, or the protection
of public health or morals.
Taken as a whole, the international agreements reviewed
above-the
U.N.
Charter,
UNESCO
Constitution,
and

89.
See Banjul Charter, supra note 88, arts. 9, 27-29, at 60, 63; American
Convention, supra note 80, art. 13, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 148, 9 I.L.M. at 679;
European Convention, supranote 87, art. 10, at 230.
90.
American Convention, supranote 80, art. 13(2), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 149, 9
I.L.M. at 679.
91.
European Convention, supranote 87, art. 10(2), at 230.
92.
Banjul Charter, supra note 88, art. 9(2), at 60.
93.
See American Convention, supra note 80. art. 13(2), 1114 U.N.T.S. at
149, 9 I.L.M. at 679; Banjul Charter, supra note 88, arts. 27-29, at 63; European
Convention, supra note 87, art. 10(2). at 230.
94.
American Convention, supranote 80, art. 13(5), 1114 U.N.T.S. at 149, 9
I.L.M. at 680.
95.
European Convention, supranote 87, art. 10(2), at 230.
96.
Banjul Charter, supra note 88, arts. 27(2), 29(4-5, 8), at 63-64.

150

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 30:135

an
conventions-constitute
regional
and
international
international standard, recognizing freedom of expression and the
free flow of information. Although several of these documents
have no binding legal effect and are unenforceable, they
nevertheless represent important statements by the parties to the
agreement, espousing the principle of freedom of expression and
information.
More importantly, these agreements limit the right to freedom
of expression and information in certain circumstances. When
national security or public order and safety interests are the
reasons for a restriction upon expression or access to information,
the right to freedom of expression and information Is justifiably
abridged. Therefore, while the right to freedom of expression and
information is recognized in the international community,
restrictions of that right are available and justified. Given this
international standard, the next section examines whether the
United Nations has the ability to restrict media coverage of U.N.
peacekeeping operations.
IV. POWER OF THE U.N. TO RESTRICT MEDIA COVERAGE OF
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The United Nations has the power to establish media rules
and restrictions concerning press coverage of U.N. peacekeeping
operations. The actual ability to restrict media coverage Is evident
from the powers delegated to the Security Council and the binding
nature of its decisions on member states as designated in the
Furthermore, as the United Nations has
U.N. Charter. 9 7
demonstrated through its efforts to address the media and
communications in the international context of UNESCO and with
respect to the international protection of journalists, issues of the
media and communications are well within U.N. concern.
A. Peacekeepingpower of the United Nations
The U.N. Charter in Article I provides the primary purpose of
the United Nations:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of
aggression or other breaches of peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice

See generally Simma, supra note 64, for an extensive history and
97.
analysis of the U.N. Charter.
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and international law, adjustment or settlement of international
98
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

The Charter creates a system of collective security to maintain
In order to achieve this
international peace and security.
essential purpose, Chapter VII's Article 39 empowers the Security
Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of peace, or act of aggression and . . . make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken... to
maintain or restore international peace and security."9 9

Accordingly, the most common "global community function"
of the Security Council is the issuance of declarations
determining whether a state's behavior "constitutes a 'threat to
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression'."' 0 0 In doing
so, the Security Council encourages the relevant parties to reach
a peaceful resolution and triggers its ability to pursue
enforcement powers under Chapter VII.10 1
Before the Security Council pursues enforcement measures
under Article 39, Article 40 of the Charter authorizes the Security
Council "to call upon the parties concerned to comply with such
0 2
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable."'
Article 40 declarations include declarations that demand or
encourage the parties to stop fighting, to engage in and maintain
ceasefires, or to pursue processes that would lead to a permanent
03

peace.1

Pursuant to Articles 41 and 42, however, the Security
Council may authorize peacekeeping operations. Under Article
41, the Security Council may implement "measures not involving
the use of armed forces . . . and may call upon the Members of
the United Nations to apply such measures." 0 4 Such measures
include "complete or partial interruption of economic relations

and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means1 0of
5
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations."

98.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
99.
Id. art. 39.
100. Murphy, supra note 4, at 210 (citing U.N. CHARTER, art. 39).
101. Id.
102. U.N. CHARTER art. 40.
103. Murphy, supra note 4, at 211. Through Article 40 declarations, the
Security Council attempts to address the conflict's underlying problem and
encourage the parties to resolve this problem through negotiations. For example,
the Security Council "called upon Iraq and Kuwait to negotiate a resolution of
'their differences,' urged the parties in Somalia to pursue a process of national
reconciliation, and demanded that the parties to the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia stop their fighting, adhere to a cease-fire, and negotiate a political
solution." Id.
104.

U.N. CHARTER art. 41.

105.

Id.
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Under Article 42, the Security Council "may take action by air,
sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security."1'
According to Article 42,
"Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations."' 0 7 Thus, in order to fulfill its duty under Article 39, the
Security Council may authorize non-military enforcement
measures under Article 41 or military action under Article 42.
The decisions of the Security Council to implement
peacekeeping operations are binding upon all member states.
Article 25 of the Charter provides that "[t]he Members of the
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
10 8
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
Article 48 further states that "[t]he action required to carry out
the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security shall be taken by all the
Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the
Security Council may determine." 0
Article 48 reaffirms the
obligation of member states under Article 25 to accept the binding
0
decisions of the Security Council in the peacekeeping context. 10
Peacekeeping is not explicitly provided for by the U.N.
Charter."' t However, the power to deploy such operations Is
based upon Chapter VII of the Charter 112 and has developed into
an internationally acceptable mechanism to ensure global
security. 113
B. Formationand Command of Peacekeeping Operations
Although peacekeeping is not explicitly codified in the U.N.
Charter, the practice of peacekeeping has developed a uniform

106.
U.N. CHARTER art 42.
107. Id.
108. Id. art. 25. For a discussion of the interpretation and scope of this
article, see Simma, supra note 64, at 409-15.
109.
U.N. CHARTER art. 48.
110.
Simma, supra note 64, at 651.
111.
Lehmann, supra note 5, at 109.
112.
Murphy, supranote 4, at 226.
113.
FETHERSTON, supra note 5, at 1-30.
Fetherston provides a helpful
framework in understanding the development of U.N. peacekeeping, dividing U.N.
peacekeeping into six stages: The Nascent Period (1946-56), the Assertive Period

(1956-67), the Dormant Period (1967-73), the Resurgent Period (1973-78), the
Maintenance Period (1978-88), and the Expansion Period (1988-93), See Simnma,
supra note 64, at 576-87 (enumerating and describing each armed U.N.
peacekeeping mission).
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Generally, the operation is
pattern for these operations." 4
15
The
created by a resolution of the Security Council.
resolutions generally support reports submitted by the U.N.
Secretary-General which establish the mandate and functioning
The Security Council then forms an
of the operation." 6
concerning their
states involved
member
the
with
agreement
1 17
relationship during the peacekeeping effort.
Current U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali
identified four kinds of modern U.N. peacekeeping efforts:
preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-

conflict peace-building. 118 According to the Secretary-General,
preventative diplomacy comprises "action to prevent disputes
from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from
escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when
they occur."1 19 Peacemaking consists of "action to bring hostile
parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as
those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United
Nations." 120 Peacekeeping relates to "the deployment of a United
Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the
parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military
12 1
and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well."
Finally, post-conflict peace-building refers to "action to identify
and solidify
and support structures which will tend to strengthen
12 2
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."
Control over peacekeeping efforts rests with the Security
Council. 123 As for peacekeeping operations, one commentator has
124
In the
suggested two models for U.N. command and control.
"single-state" model, the Security Council (after authorizing an
operation) allows a dominant state to exercise political control,
strategic direction, and operational command over forces that are

114.

Simma,supra note 64, at 587. See generally STEVEN R. RATNER, THE NEW

UN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN LANDS OF CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR (1995);

INDAR JIT RIKHYE, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PEACEKEEPING (1984).
115. Simma,supranote 64, at 587-88.

116.

Id.at588.

117.

Id.

118. An Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 956, 960 (1992)
[hereinafter Agendafor Peace].

119.

Agendafor Peace,supranote 118, 31 I.L.M. at 960.

120.
121.

Id.
Id.

122. Id. Pursuant to these U.N. efforts, there are four basic functions of a
peacekeeping military unit: observation and verification, interposition, maintenance
of law and order, and humanitarian assistance. Simma, supranote 64, at 588-89.
123. James W. Houck, The Command and Control of United Nations Forces in
the Eraof "PeaceEnforcement" 4 DuI J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 22-23 (1993).
124. Id. at 19.

154

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 30:135

provided by a single state acting alone or at the head of a
nominally multinational coalition.12 5 According to the "managedcoalition" model, the Security Council (after authorizing the
operation) allows a dominant state to manage, but not dictate,
political, strategic, and command
decisions through an ad hoc
12 6
and truly multinational coalition.
Thus, as evident from the text of the U.N. Charter and the
actual practice of peacekeeping operations, the Security Council
is the authorizing body of peacekeeping operations and has
ultimate control over them. The Security Council determines
whether a threat to international peace exists. Most importantly,
the Security Council determines what the appropriate response
will be to that threat and provides the parameters of the
responsive action that member states are obligated to follow.
C. UNESCO
UNESCO was established by the U.N. General Assembly on
November 16, 1945,127 "to contribute to peace and security by
promoting collaboration among the nations through education,
science and culture." 128 Its programs are divided into "five
substantive sectors: education,
natural science, social science,
12 9
culture, and communication."
Within the communication sector, there are two main
divisions: the Division of the Free Flow of Information and the
Division of Development of Communication Systems. 130 The first
division seeks to promote freedom of information by removing
obstacles that hamper it, while the second division tries to
improve the means and techniques of information distribution. 131
Thus, the formation and existence of UNESCO represents U.N.
concern with freedom of expression in the international context
and its ability to address that concern.
Pursuant to its purpose of facilitating international
communication, UNESCO
adopted the
Declaration
on
Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass
Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding,

to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racism,
Apartheid, and Incitement to War (hereinafter "Mass Media

125.
126.

Id.
Id.

127.
128.
129.

DAvID C. COYLE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HoW IT WORKS 36 (1969).
UNESCO CONST. arL I, § 1.
GIFFARD, supranote 64, at 3.

130.
131.

Id.at 15.
Id.
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Declaration"). 1 3 2 The declaration promoted journalistic freedom
to report, 13 3 protection for journalists, t 3 4 and a free and balanced

flow of information. 13 5 However, some commentators saw this
last provision as a compromise to an earlier former Soviet Unionsponsored draft proposing "complete government control of
13 6
information media."
The draft proposal was a reflection of the efforts by the former
Soviet bloc and Third World nations to establish a New World
Information and Communication Order (NWICO). 1 37 The purpose
of NWICO was to compensate for the Western bias that the former
Soviet bloc and Third World nations perceived in news reporting
and to ensure a more balanced flow of information through state
Western nations, however, viewed
control of the media. 13 8
NWICO as incompatible with the freedom of expression and the
39
free flow of information. 1
At the 1980 UNESCO General Conference, the MacBride
Formed in response to
Commission Report 140 was released. 14
the Mass Media Declaration, the MacBride Commission Report
contained over eighty recommendations in an attempt to provide
solutions to the media imbalance perceived by Third World
Although the MacBride Commission Report
nations. 14 2
reaffirmed the principles of freedom and diversity, and advocated

the elimination of governmental interference with those
principles, the report also recommended codes of ethics for

132. UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res. 4/9.3/2, 20th Sess. (1978), reprinted in ANN.
REv.U.N. AFF. 238-40 [hereinafter Mass Media Declaration].
133. Id. art. I (2).
134. Id. art. 11 (4).
135. Id. art. IX.
136.
Cifrino, supra note 63, at 121 (quoting DraftDeclarationon Fundamental
Prlnciples Governing the Use of the Mass Media In Strengthening Peace and
International Understandingand Combating War Propaganda,Racism and Apartheid,
19 UNESCO Gen. Conf.Rec., UNESCO Doc. 19 C/Proceedings, at 91 (1976), and
citing Wolfe, A New InternationalInformation Order: The Developing World and the
Free Flow ofInformaton Controversy, 8 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 249, 261 (1980)).
137.
Farley, supranote 63, at 1072-73.
138. Id. at 1073-74. These nations contended that Western news agencies,
which supply most of the world's news, portrayed Third World nations in a negative
light in reporting only stories about "political instability, human rights violations,
corruption and internal violence, natural disasters, and social and economic
problems." Id. at 1073. Due to this portrayal by the Western media, the rest of the
world has developed a negative perception of these nations. Thus, the Western
media, at best, is oriented to Western interests and values and, at worst, threatens
the independence and national Identity of Third World nations. Id. at 1073-74.
GIFFARD, supranote 64, at 21.
139.
140.
SEAN MACBRIDE ET AL., MANY VOICES ONE WORLD: COMMUNICATION AND
SOCIETY TODAY AND ToMoRRow (1980).
141.
Farley, supranote 63, at 1075.
142.
Farley, supranote 63, at 1075; Cifrino, supranote 63, at 122.
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journalists and disapproved centralized private ownership of
communication
agencies. 14 3
However,
none of the
recommendations from the MacBride Commission Report were
adopted by UNESCO,
as the report never made it on the agenda of
144
the conference.
The 1980 UNESCO Conference did adopt the International
Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC). 1 4 5
Proposed by the United States, the IPDC was designed to improve
the communications systems of less developed nations and to
avoid the issue of government censorship. Yet in balancing the
interests of the member states, UNESCO14also
approved programs
6
to further develop the concept of NWICO.

Western news agencies countered UNESCO's efforts towards

14 7 in May of 1981.148
NWICO with the Declaration of Talloires

The Declaration of Talloires advocated the freedom of expression
and the free flow of information. 14 9
More importantly, it
condemned governmental censorship, international code of
journalistic ethics, and licensing of journalists by national or
0
international bodies.15
Following UNESCO's continued efforts to consider a code of
ethics for journalists and its recognition at the UNESCO
Conference in 1983 that governments have a right to control the
flow of information, 15 1 the United States and Great Britain
resigned and withdrew their funding from UNESCO in 1984.152
The United States cited the political nature of UNESCO debates

and activities, the use of UNESCO as a forum against freedom of
the press, and the $374.4 million budget of UNESCO adopted in
1984 as reasons for its withdrawal. 153 By March of 1984, twentyfour Western countries submitted a proposal for major reforms to

143.

Farley, supranote 63, at 1076 n.30.

144. Id. at 1076.
145.
UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res. 4/21, 21st Sess. (1980).
146.
Farley, supranote 63. at 1077.
147. See td. (citing The Declaration of Talloires (Voices of Freedom Conference
1981), reprinted In Singh & Gross, "MacBrlde:" The Report and the Response. 31 J.
CoM. 104, 113-15 (1981)).
148. Id. at 1077.
149.
Cifrino, supra note 63, at 123.
150.
Farley, supranote 63, at 1077-78. The Declaration ofTalloires II, Issued
in October of 1983, reaffirmed the major tenets of the first declaration. The
Declaration of Talloires II emphasized the "importance of private and independent

news media, and called for ways to ensure the editorial independence of stateowned news media and to establish the press as a guardian against abuses of
power." Id. at 1079.
151. Id. at 1078-79.
152. Cifrino, supranote 63, at 123. Singapore withdrew later, as well. Id. at
123 n.29.
153. Farley, supranote 63, at 1079.
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UNESCO

programs.

15 4

to

its

continuing

consideration

of
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NWICO

The experience of UNESCO and its promotion of NWICO
reveal UNESCO's view of the international free flow of
information, and show the limitations that UNESCO, and

implicitly the United Nations, must confront in implementing a
policy concerning the freedom of expression and the free flow of
information in an international context. Such limitations include
the polarized views of the international community concerning
freedom of the press and the appropriateness of international
governance over that freedom, the organized resistance of the
press to media restrictions, and the ability of member states to
impede policy initiatives by withdrawing their membership from
an international organization. For the United Nations, and more
specifically the Security Council, to restrict media coverage during
peacekeeping operations, awareness of such limitations and the
ability to overcome them are imperative for success.
D. InternationalProtectionof Journalists
Although international efforts to protect journalists have been
sporadic, attempts to increase the protection of journalists have
arisen within the U.N. context. 155 As shown by such efforts, the
United Nations is a proper forum for the discussion and
resolution of issues concerning freedom of expression and media
restrictions in the international community.
The first U.N. effort at addressing the journalist's role was the
creation of the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of
the Press by the Commission on Human Rights in 1947.156 The
Sub-Commission held only five sessions, but drafted the articles
on freedom of information for the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political

154.
155.

Id. at 1080 n.53.
The United Nations has also addressed the need to protect peacekeepers

during U.N. peacekeeping operations. On December 9, 1994, the U.N. General
Assembly adopted the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel. See G.A. Res. 59, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/59
(1995). This multilateral convention provides legal remedies for the prosecution and

punishment of persons accused of attacking U.N. peacekeepers and associated
personnel. See Evan T. Bloom, Protecting Peacekeepers: The Convention on the
Sqfety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,89 AM. J. INT'L L. 621, 621 (1995).
156. Amit Mukherjee, The Internationallzation of Journalists' "Rights"%An
HlstoricalAnalysts, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 87, 96 (1995). For a historical overview of
international efforts toward the protection of Journalists, see Mukherjee, supra note
63.
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Rights. 15 7 Further, it convened "a Conference on Freedom of
Information" in 1948 which recommended three draft conventions
concerning the gathering and transmission of news, the
institution of an international right of correction, and freedom of
information.15 8 After much discussion and amendments, the
U.N. General Assembly approved only the Convention on an
15 9
International Right of Correction.
Following an appeal by the Secretary-General on behalf of
seventeen journalists missing in Indochina in 1970,160 the U.N.
General Assembly proposed a draft convention for the protection
of journalists engaged in areas of armed conflict. 16 1 In November
1 62
of 1973, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution
encouraging the adoption of the draft convention for the
protection of journalists and requested that the Secretary-General
convey the draft convention to the Diplomatic Conference on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. 16 3 However, this phase of
protecting journalists ended
consideration for a draft convention
16 4
at the Diplomatic Conference.
During this period, professional media organizations also
1 65
submitted a draft convention for the protection of journalists.
After being reviewed by UNESCO and the Commission on Human
1 66
Rights, a revised draft convention was adopted by UNESCO

157. Mukherjee, supra note 156, at 96. For a discussion about the article
concerning freedom of information in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see Infra part II.B-C.
158.
Mukherjee, supra note 156, at 96-97. The Sub-Commission and the
Conference on Freedom are notable not for their accomplishments, but in their
deference to the sovereign power of the state, their revelation of the fundamental
differences in approach to the freedom of the press, and their revelation of Western
ambivalence between freedom of expression and concern for the social
accountability of the media. Id. at 96.

159.

Id. at 98.

The Convention on the International Right of Correction

provides a mechanism for a State to provide Its Interpretation of events when that
State contends that a news dispatch "capable of injuring its relations with other
States or its national prestige or dignity... is false or distorted." Convention on an
InternationalRight of Correction, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 22, U.N.
Doc. A/2361 (1952).
160. Mukherjee, supranote 156, at 102. See Protectionof JournalistsEngaged
in Dangerous Missions in Areas of Armed Confllct. Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Provisional Agenda 52(b), U.N. Doc. A/8371 (1971).
161.
MukherJee. supra note 156, at 102-03.
162. G.A. Res. 3058, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Agenda Item 54, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3058 (1973).
Mukherjee, supranote 156, at 103.
163.
164. Id. at 103.
165. Id.
166. PreliminaryDraft InternationalConventon on the Protection of Journalists
Engaged in Dangerous Missions, UNESCO, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 1. at 2, U.N. Doc.
5044 (1971).
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and was sent to the U.N. General Assembly. 16 7 The SecretaryGeneral also submitted the U.N. draft convention to member
states for their comments. 168 Subsequent to this 1973 effort, the
United Nations ceased considering any international convention
on the protection of journalists until 1990.169
The Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights
has been the forum for two recent U.N. initiatives concerning the
protection of journalists. 170 The first effort was the Sadi Report
submitted to the Sub-Commission in 1990.171
The report
emphasized the role of journalists as a source for human rights
awareness and recommended that the Sub-Commission take the
leading
role
in
providing
international
protection
for
journalists. 1 7 2 In response, the Sub-Commission then proposed
that Sadi prepare a preliminary study on ways and means to
extend journalist protection. However, the Sub-Commission has
effectively put aside this effort by deferring consideration of the
173
study until a later session.
The Tfirk-Joinet Report174 in 1992 was the Sub-Commission's
second attempt to address the international protection of
journalists, and more particularly, their right to freedom of
opinion and expression. 1 75
While recognizing the right of
journalists to freedom of expression, the report acknowledged that
restrictions on that right were permissible. 176 According to the
report, a restriction on freedom of expression must meet three
necessity.17 7
legality, and democratic
criteria: legitimacy,
Although the report has generated much debate over its assertion

167. MukherJee, supranote 156, at 103.
168. Id. at 104.
169. Id. at 107-09.
170. Id. at 108.
171. Id. at 109. The report was based upon a draft resolution, submitted by
Sub-Commission member, Waleed Sadi, which recognized the importance of
journalists in revealing human rights violations and recommended a study on the
feasibility of extending additional protection to journalists. Id. at 108-09; Draft
Resolution on Protection of Journalists, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/L.24 (1989).
172. Mukherjee, supra note 156, at 108-09.
173. Id.at 109.
174. UNESCO, 44th Sess., Provisional of Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/9 (1992).
175. Mukherjee, supranote 156, at 110.
176. IdatlO.
177. Id. at 110-11. Legitimacy is the requirement that the restriction "has in
view one of the goals of the limitations expressly enumerated in the international
treaties in the field of human rights." Id. at 110. Legality is the requirement that the
restriction be "prescribed by relevant domestic law." Id. at 111. Democratic
necessity is the requirement that the restriction be in accordance with "democratic
principles of the rule of law and human rights." Id. at 111.
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of allowable controls over the freedom of expression, 178 the Sub179
Commission again took no action regarding the report.
Due to the historical lack of initiative in the protection of
journalists by the United Nations, one commentator concluded
that "the immediate prospect of enhanced international protection
of journalists through an internationally enforceable regime of

journalists' rights seems remote." 180 The inconclusive results of
U.N. efforts demonstrate the difficulties the United Nations
confronts in implementing substantive mandates in the area of
international communication, particularly in light of the
incompatible views of Western and non-Western states
concerning the media. 18 1 More importantly, these efforts indicate
that the media and international communication are appropriate
issues of discussion and for potential regulation by the United
Nations.

V.

INTERESTS OF THE U.N. AND THE MEDIA IN MEDIA COVERAGE AND
RESTRICTIONS

The United Nations and the media each have specific
interests in media coverage and restrictions during U.N.
peacekeeping operations.
Although these interests are not
necessarily mutually exclusive, they are interests that derive from
the individual nature and functions of the United Nations and the
media. Thus, in the peacekeeping context, the interests of the
United Nations and the media converge and diverge according to
the functions of each entity during peacekeeping operations.

178. The World Press Freedom Committee and the U.S. observer objected to
the report's endorsement of permissible restrictions on freedom of expression. Id. at
111-12. Another group supported the report's conclusions and encouraged the
Sub-Conunission to develop -guidelines according to the report's criteria for
restrictions. Id. at 112.
179.
Id. at 112-13.
180. Id. at 113.
181. According to one commentator:
U.N. debates on information issues during this period portend to
three recurring themes traditionally hampering a solution to the problem
of mistreatment of journalists:
first, the principle of freedom of
information is subservient to the principle that the state has the sovereign

right to delineate the boundaries of any "freedom" within its jurisdiction;

second, the Western and non-Western states have incompatible views
regarding information questions in the world; and lastly, the Western
countries are ambivalent between their professed ideal of freedom of
expression, and their concern for the social accountability of the media.
Mukherjee, supranote 156, at 100.
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A. U.N. Perspective
Within the peacekeeping context, the United Nations
primarily performs a military function. The Security Council
mandates operations that have the objective of enforcing peace in
conflicted areas, while also authorizing them to use armed force.
Thus, the success of the operations and the safety of
peacekeeping troops in achieving that success are of supreme
concern for the United Nations. The power to achieve these
objectives "requires confidentiality and secrecy." 182 Any breach of
and a threat
secrecy could "lead to serious casualties at the least,
18 3
to... [the peacekeeping operation] at the extreme."
In furthering its interests in overall operational success and
troop safety, the United Nations has the additional interest of

ensuring that nothing threatens the tactical execution of its
peacekeeping operations. Maintaining the advantage of surprise
is paramount in its successful execution of any peacekeeping
operation. Arguably, the publication by the media of certain
information may endanger the security of a peacekeeping
operation or peacekeeping troops. 18 4 Moreover, the presence of
the media during peacekeeping operations creates a concern for
safe transportation of reporters as well
the United Nations in the
18 5
as peacekeeping troops.
In addition to its military function, the United Nations also
has an administrative function to promote the necessity and
wisdom of its peacekeeping actions to the international
community. Consequently, the United Nations has an interest in
the public perception of its peacekeeping operations. According to
one commentator, "[plublic opinion is now a major factor in
international conflict management and conflict resolution. In
order to achieve their goals, U.N. peacekeeping operations . . .
need an overall positive image, both inside the territory in which
they are deployed and in the international community at
large."18 6
The high-profile media and instantaneous media coverage 18of7
peacekeeping operations add to the pressure of public opinion.

182. Steven Neff, The United States Military vs. The Medav Constuttonal
Friction,46 MERCER L. REv. 977, 1004 (1995).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1004-05.
185. Cassell, supranote 3. at 931; see also Debra Gersh, The Press in Somalia,
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Jan. 23, 1993, at 11 (describing hazardous conditions for
journalists reporting from Somalia during U.N. peacekeeping operations); Elizabeth
Valk Long, To Our Readers, TIME, June 12, 1995, at 4 (describing dangers
journalists face in war-torn Bosnia).
186. Lehmann, supra note 5, at 118.
187. Id.at 111.
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Instantaneous coverage from the theater of operations creates
lasting images in the international public mind, garnering support
or opposition to the operation. 188 Portraying powerful images to
the international public, this "CNN factor"18 9 influences public
will, and when unfavorable, challenges the United Nations to
maintain support from not only the public as a whole, but also
Thus, in the
more specifically, from the member states. 190
peacekeeping context, the United Nations has a military and an
administrative function-both of which involve a relationship with
the media. It is therefore necessary for the United Nations to
develop a policy towards the media aligned with its operational
and administrative interests in order to ensure the success of its
peacekeeping operations.
B. Media Perspective
Generally, the media operate as a source of information and a
"forum for the citizenry to voice their opinions." 19 1 These media
functions are particularly vital during peacekeeping operations
where lives are at risk and the resources of U.N. member states
Thus, the media require access to
are being expended.
information about peacekeeping operations in order to keep the
public informed about the operations, and especially, military
19 2
actions by member states under a U.N. peacekeeping mandate.
The media need full and accurate information sources for their
Timeliness is also a requisite for
international audiences.
Therefore, during peacekeeping
effective media reporting.
is to have unrestricted access to
interest
the
media's
operations,
operational sites and uncensored reporting.
As a public forum, the media serve a monitoring purpose
during peacekeeping operations. 19 3 The media both shape the

188. For an analysis of the media's role in shaping perspectives concerning
peacekeeping operations, see Jonathan Alter, Did the Press Push Us Into Somalia,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 21 1992, at 33. See also Peter Brock, Dateline Yugoslavlk The
PartisanPress, FOREIGN POLICY, winter 1993, at 152; Charles Lane, War Stories, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 3, 1994, at 43.
189. Les Aspin, Challenges to Values-Based Military Intervention, in
MANAGING CHAOS, supra note 30, at 5.
190. See MANAGING CHAOS, supra notes 30, at 1-15, for a discussion of the
powerful role of the media in forming foreign policy from the perspectives of both the

military and the media.
191. Mukherjee, supra note 156, at 87.
192. Information about a nation's military action is especially important, as "it
is generally recognized that 'ars' are of paramount importance to citizens when
evaluating and electing government leaders." Cross & Griffin, supra note 3, at 1031.
193. According to Justice Black of the U.S. Supreme Court. the function of the
media is to "serve the governed, not the governors." "This responsibility extends to
the duty of preventing the government 'from deceiving the people and sending them

19971

MEDIA RULES DURING U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

163

perceptions of the public and provide a channel for public
opinion. 194 The public and U.N. member states need to make
informed decisions about the purpose and validity of
peacekeeping operations. Worthwhile public debate and decisions

will only result from honest and full information. The role of the
media is to provide the international public with as much
information as possible in making such determinations. 195
Furthermore, in order to be effective in
promoting informed
decisions, this information must be independent of the U.N. point
of view. For these purposes, it is important for the media to have
access to peacekeeping sites and to enjoy uncensored reporting.
Essentially, the media are an informational source for the
international public, enabling individuals to form opinions and to
create positive or negative pressure concerning peacekeeping
operations. The role of the public cannot be discounted, as public
opinion may persuade member states to support or oppose
peacekeeping operations. To be effective in informing the public,
the media must provide information fully, accurately, and quickly.
Therefore, U.N. restrictions of the media must create a balance
between the media's interests and those of the United Nations.

VI. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF U.N MEDIA RULES DURING PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS

As stated above, the United Nations has the power to
authorize peacekeeping operations and to define the parameters
of those operations. t 9 6 Thus, it is within U.N. authority to
establish media rules during peacekeeping operations. Taking
into account the varying interests of the United Nations and the

media, U.N. media rules during peacekeeping operations would
prove to be beneficial by ensuring independent media coverage

off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell'." Neff, supra
note 182, at 1003 (quoting New York Times v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)).
194. According to Ted Koppel, media reports "are destined to have a
disproportionate influence on public opinion because no countervailing compass
point exists." MANAGING CHAOS, supra note 30, at 14. Koppel goes on to suggest
that it is the media, not the government, that has taken the lead in determining U.S.
foreign policy. Id. at 15; see also MARTIN LINSKY, IMPACT: How THE PRESS AFFECTS

FEDERAL POLICYMAKING 69 (1986) (citing a recent survey which showed that over 96%
of those governmental officials interviewed thought the media had an effect on
policymaking and over one-half believed that the media's influence was substantial).
195. Paul Cassell suggests that the media are not "a particularly potent device
for discovering what goes on at the battlefront." Cassell, supra note 3. at 968.
According to Cassell, "publicized congressional hearings on military operations
abroad would probably provide much more information than even the most
expansive of press access policies." Id. at 968 n.267.
196. See supra part IV.
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from operational sites while limiting the potential harm by the
media to U.N. operational success.
A. Procedureto EstablishMedia Rules
In authorizing a peacekeeping operation, the Security Council
provides a broad mandate of action. Media rules for peacekeeping
operations could be included in this mandate. By providing welldefined media rules before the implementation of a peacekeeping
operation, the Security Council would avoid ad hoc media
restrictions and potential conflicts between peacekeeping forces
19 7
and the media during a peacekeeping operation.
In establishing media rules, the Security Council should first
consult with the participating member states of a peacekeeping
operation and the media. This kind of discussion has resulted in
general agreement between the military and the media concerning
media restrictions during U.N.-sanctioned U.S.-led military
operations. 198 The Security Council may also consult the General
Assembly for a diverse perspective on the issue of media
restrictions.
Once the Security Council has determined the media rules for
a particular peacekeeping operation, it is vital that these rules are
formally introduced to the media and peacekeeping forces.
Awareness by both the peacekeeping forces and the media of
these formal guidelines will create a common understanding
between the parties.
In this regard, the rules should be

distributed to the press and forces if possible, or at the least,
clearly articulated.
The International Peace Academy in its
Peacekeeper's Handbook emphasized the importance of clarity in
effectuating guidelines for peacekeeper interaction with the
press. 19 9 The Handbook states, "A member of a peacekeeping
Force/Mission can at anytime be approached by members of the
press corps, whether by arrangement or not. It is important that

197.
See suprapart I.B-C.
198.
Following the Persian Gulf War, the Pentagon and major U.S. news
organizations negotiated and agreed upon nine principles for news coverage of
battlefield operations. The military and the media "agreed to disagree on the issue
of prior review." Debra Gersh, War Coverage Guidelines: After Six Months of Talks.
Media and Military Agree on Proposed Prlncplesfor News Coverage of Battlefield
Operations,ED1TOR& PUBLISHER, Mar. 21, 1992, at 18.
199.
INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY, PEACEKEEPER'S HANDBOOK 340 (1984).
Established in 1970, "Itlhe International Peace Academy (IPA) is a nonpolitical,
nonprofit, educational institute." Id. at vii-ix. One of the important roles of the...
(IPA) ... is the development of skills and techniques for greater efficiency within
peacekeeping forces."
Id. at ix. The Peacekeeper's Handbook compiles the
experiences of present and former members of U.N. operations with the intent to

prepare future peacekeepers. Id.
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clear instructions are issued 0indicating how the peacekeeper
20
should act towards the press."
With formal media rules that are clearly defmed and
presented, the Security Council, and effectively the United
Nations, provide the media and peacekeeping forces with a
cohesive set of guidelines.
Formal U.N. media rules will
circumvent the ad hoc application of media restrictions by the
participating member states and pursue the interests of both the
United Nations and the media more effectively.
B. U.N.'s Media Policy and Rules
While individual peacekeeping operations may require
operation-specific media rules, the United Nations should adopt
basic guidelines for media coverage during peacekeeping
operations.
This precommitment to an established set of
guidelines prevents the United Nations from implementing
arbitrary revisions, absent a specific need by a particular
operation, 20 1 and encourages media compliance by ensuring the
media of consistent and familiar rules.
U.N. media rules should establish what the media may report
and regulate the media's access to various types of
information. 20 2 Because operational success is paramount to
peacekeeping operations the Security Council may restrict media
coverage if such coverage would endanger the operation,
peacekeeping troops, or reporters. However, the Security Council
may also justify any media restriction by citing concern for
tactical execution and security. On the other hand, the media's
ability to shape and voice public opinion should temper any
inclination on the part of the Security Council to overregulate the
media.
Thus, U.N. media rules should reflect a balance between the
roles of the U.N. and the media during peacekeeping operations.
Generally, U.N. media rules should intrude as little as possible on
news reporting. When operational security is at risk, however,
greater media restrictions should be implemented by the Security
Council. As one commentator stated, "Some control over the
media in a war zone is necessary. However, the military should
be aware of the potential backlash that may result from a hardline approach to media relations. When controls are necessary,

200.
201.

Id.at 340.
Steger, supranote 1, at 1000.

202.

Id. at 1001.
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they should cause as little intrusion into news gathering as
20 3
possible."

In determining specific media guidelines, two previous efforts
by the U.S. military and the media to create clear guidelines for
media coverage of military operations provide a useful framework.
The first was the Sidle Panel recommendation which followed the
U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983.204
The second was the
"Statement of Principles" negotiated by the Pentagon and the
media after the Persian Gulf War. 20 5
Both of these efforts

demonstrate the ability of the military and the media to negotiate
general guidelines and the balance necessary to ensure the
interests of both the military and the media.
1. The Sidle Panel

As a result of media dissatisfaction with the Grenada
invasion, the Department of Defense formed the Sidle Panel,
headed by Major General Winant Sidle, to study military-press
relations.2 0 6
"[R]epresentatives from journalism schools, the
media, and the military" participated in the Panel. 20 7 The Panel's
report included eight recommendations to improve military-press
relations. 20 8 The Panel recommended that the military plan for
media coverage concurrently with operational planning, devise a
reporter accreditation system, encourage voluntary compliance

203. Captain William A. Wilcox, Jr., Media Coverage of Military Operations:
OPLAW Meets the First Amendment, ARMY LAw., May 1995, at 42, 51 (1995). In
listing factors which relate to media relations, the International Peace Academy in
Peacekeeper'sHandbook also recognized the importance of this balance between the
objectives of the United Nations and the media. The Peacekeeper'sHandbookstates:
[Pleacekeeping operations will attract the attention of a widely
representative press corps. Its aim will be to get news and it will take
every step to obtain it. It should not be obstructed unjustifiably in its
efforts, but when these encroach on sensitive areas of the U.N. role and
operational practices it is advisable to seek the advice of the Press
Information Officer.
It is helpful to good relations with the media for the Force/Mission
Commander, or one of his senior staff officers, to meet and brief the press
at regular intervals. The better the links with the press corps the more
understanding It is likely to be to the Force/Mission problems.
INTERNATIONAL PEACEAcAnEMY, supranote 199. at 341.
204. Wilcox, supra note 203, at 47.
205.
Short & Pope, supranote 23, at 9.
206.
Steger, supra note 1, at 969. The Department of Defense excluded all
press members from Grenada until their safety could be guaranteed. Id. "The
complete exclusion of reporters constituted an unprecedented news blackout for
American combat operations." Id.
207. Wilcox, supranote 203, at 47.
208.
Steger, supranote 1, at 969-70.

1997) MEDIA RULES DURING U.N. PEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS

167

ground rules, and develop a system of press
with established
09
pools.

2

The reaction of the media to the report was generally
supportive, as the report was seen as a compromise between
media coverage and operational logistics and security. 2 10 Though
the Sidle Panel was in response to a specific situation, its
recommendations established general media guidelines "that
21 1
theoretically direct the military's press relations efforts today."
2. Statement of Principles
After six months of negotiations following the Persian Gulf
War, the Pentagon and the media agreed on nine principles
concerning press coverage during military operations and
essentially agreed to disagree on the issue of prior security review

of press reports.2 1 2 The "Statement of Principles" demonstrated

the continuing efforts of the U.S. military and the media to attain

209.
were:

Wilcox. supra note 203, at 47. Specifically, the eight recommendations

Public affairs planning for military operations should be conducted
1.
concurrently with operational planning.
When news media pooling provides the only feasible means of early
2.
access to an operation, planning should support the largest possible press
pool, but only for the minimum length of time necessary.
The Secretary of Defense should study whether a list of accredited
3.
journalists or merely accredited news organizations is necessary.
The media should voluntarily comply with security guidelines.
4.
Qualified military personnel should assist journalists covering
5.
combat operations.
6.
The military should provide media communications as early as
feasible, provided they do not interfere with combat operations.
Military planning should consider media transportation.
7.
The military should meet regularly with media leaders to discuss
8.
mutual problems.
Steger, supra note 1, at 970 n.98 (citing REPORT BY CHAIRMEN OF THE JoINT CHIEFs OF
STAFF MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS PANEL (1984)).
Some journalists criticized the
210. Steger, supra note 1, at 970.
recommendations as vague and indeterminate, allowing the military to implement
new rules at its discretion. Id.
Wilcox, supranote 203, at 47.
211.
Gersh, supranote 198, at 18. As to prior review, the media stated, "The
212.
news organizations are convinced that journalists covering U.S. forces in combat
must be mindful at all times of operational security and the safety of American lives.
News organizations strongly believe that journalists will abide by clear operational
security ground rules. Prior security review is unwarranted and unnecessary." Id.
The Pentagon, however, asserted that the military "must retain the option to review
inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that could endanger troop
safety or the success of a mission." Id.
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common ground and clear rules concerning media coverage of
military operations.
The "Statement of Principles" stated that: (1) open and
independent reporting will be the principle means of coverage of
U.S. military operations; (2) pools are not to serve as the standard
means of covering U.S. military operations, but sometimes may
provide the only feasible means of early access to a military
operation; (3) when used, pools should be disbanded as early as
possible; (4) logistical problems may mandate pools; (5)
journalists in a combat zone will be required to abide by military
security ground rules where violation of those rules may result in
suspension of the credentials and expulsion of the journalists
involved; (6) news organizations will attempt to assign
experienced journalists to combat operations; (7) journalists will
have access to all major military units, except in some cases
involving special operations; (8) military public affairs officers
should act as liaisons, but should not interfere with the reporting
process; (9) the military will be responsible for pool transportation
and will otherwise provide transportation of journalists whenever
possible; (10) the military will supply facilities to enable timely
media transmission consistent with its capabilities and will not
inhibit the media's use of its own communications systems
operation; and (11) the principles stated above would apply as
standing Department of Defense
well to the operations of the
2 13
National Media Pool system.
Both the "Statement of Principles" and the Sidle Panel report

provide specific guidelines for media coverage during military
operations and suggest two general principles necessary for
These two
effective media rules during military operations.
and the
between
both
the
media
principles include agreement
military on media rules prior to implementing the operation and
rules that encourage open media coverage unless operational
logistics or security demand further restrictions. Therefore, in
order to strike the proper balance between the media and
military, U.N. media rules should generally create open media
coverage and only restrict such coverage in very limited
circumstances.
C. Enforceability of U.N. Media Rules

The procedure to create formal media guidelines and the
establishment of those guidelines are the initial steps in
implementing U.N. media rules for peacekeeping operations. The
most difficult issue to address, however, in implementing U.N.

213.

Id. at 18-24.
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media rules is the enforceability of those rules. In order to be
effective, U.N. media rules must include mechanisms for their
enforcement against the international media.
As noted earlier, in forming general media rules, the Security
Council should invite media input and participation. 2 14 This not
only allows the media to contribute their perspectives and

interests, but it also encourages the media to abide by the rules
through their role in formulating the rules. Furthermore, if U.N.
media rules generally favor open media coverage as proposed in
this Note, 2 15 then the media will be even more inclined to abide by
the media rules. A general agreement between the United Nations
and the media concerning media rules will promote the
effectiveness of the rules, fairness on the part of the United
Nations in applying the rules, and adherence on the part of the
media in following them.
The support of member states is also imperative to the
enforceability of U.N. media rules. International and regional
agreements indicate that the international community supports
2 16
the freedom of expression and the free flow of information.
More importantly, most of these agreements limit these freedoms
when national security or public welfare is at risk.2 17 U.N. media
rules that promote open media coverage, except when operational
security is at risk, are aligned with the view of the freedom of
expression and the free flow of information as expressed by
international laws. With the consultation of member states in
determining U.N. media rules, these rules are likely to garner the
support of member states.
Further, the formation of U.N. media rules reduces the
danger of member states withdrawing from a peacekeeping
operation, akin to the situation with UNESCO. 2 1 8 Problematic
issues that prompted Western nations, including the United
States, to withdraw from UNESCO included defining the
appropriate parameters of UNESCO and governmental control
over the media. These problems are absent from the issue of U.N.
media rules. The nature of the U.N. media rules is one of
discretionary
than
rather
cooperation,
and
openness
governmental control. Moreover, restrictions on the media would

result only from identifiable threats to operational security, not

for unknown or general governmental reasons. Finally, the
United States has already implemented such media rules in its

214.
215.
216.
217.

See supra part VIA.
See supra part VI.B.
See supra partll.
Id.

218.

See supra part IV.C.
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military operations, indicating that Western nations would be
supportive of such media rules.
With the compliance of participating member states and the
media, the Security Council effectively ensures that U.N. media
rules will be enforced during a peacekeeping operation. The
Security Council, however, also has additional options to further
enforce the media rules.
1. Accreditation
In implementing media rules, the United Nations should
formally brief reporters about the rules as well as the security
concerns of the peacekeeping operation prior to the operation
itself. This briefing would put reporters on notice to not only the
media rules, but also to the security implications that may
require later restrictions.
Additionally, the emphasis on
operational concerns would also enlighten the media as to the
potential harm an inadvertent report of information may cause to
the peacekeeping operation. 2 19 Awareness on the media's part of
this potential harm will encourage responsible reporting from an
operational site.
The U.N. briefing would also serve as an enforcement
mechanism in two ways. First, attendance at the briefing would
be required for accreditation of reporters who wish to cover the
peacekeeping operation. 2 20 Second, the conditional granting of
credentials and their revocation for violations of the media rules
would deter reporters from disregarding the rules. 2 2 1
An
accreditation system would thus promote the enforceability of
U.N. media rules.
2. Judicial Review
The determination of how U.N. media rules are to apply or

when an operational security risk warrants further restrictions
beyond the general guidelines rests with the United Nations, and
specifically with peacekeeping commanders.
This unilateral
determination may result in infringements upon the media's
ability to report about a peacekeeping operation, ranging from
access restrictions to total exclusion of reporters from an
operation. In order to guard against inappropriate or excessive
application of the media rules by the United Nations, judicial

219.
220.

Steger, supranote 1, at 1002.
See [d. at 1003 (proposing that the military briefing be a mandatory part

of the accreditation process for journalists in the U.S. military context).
221. Id.
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review of contested media regulations comprises a necessary
check on U.N. discretionary power.
In reviewing the U.N.'s application of its media rules, a court
may adopt a contractual analysis or a factor-balancing test
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court. Under a contractual

analysis, the court would review a conflict between the media and
the United Nations over the enforcement of U.N. media rules by:

"(a) enforcing the terms of the contract; (b) determining the
parties' intent by referring to the statement of principles and
purpose if the contract terms are ambiguous; (c) imposing a duty
of good faith and fair dealing; and (d) examining the parties'
on consistency with their
performance with an emphasis
22
reasonable expectations."

2

Further, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,2 23 the
U.S. Supreme Court provided a "three-part [factor-balancing] test
to determine whether the media is entitled to access to a
First, the government activity
government activity."224
historically must be open. 2 25 Second, press access must have2 2a6
significant role in the function of the government activity.

Finally, the government may nevertheless restrict press access if
a compelling government interest exists to limit access and 22these
7
limits are narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest.
Applying these criteria, judicial review in the peacekeeping
context may be performed by domestic courts or the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J.). The utilization of either court has its
advantages and disadvantages. No one factor is determinative in
favoring one court over the other. In addition, the use of one
court does not necessarily exclude the availability of the other.
The possibility of either of these courts as bodies of judicial review
is briefly discussed below.
a. Domestic Courts
Judicial review in domestic courts allows reporters to directly
contest U.N. application of U.N. media rules. The media also has

the advantage of appearing before its own national courts.
Furthermore, the participants involved in the case would most

likely be of the same national origin, as media organizations most

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
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Short & Pope, supra note 23, at 23-24.
457 U.S. 596 (1982).
Wilcox, supranote 203, at 50.
See Id. at 50 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605).
See Wilcox, supra note 203, at 50 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at
See Wilcox, supra note 203, at 50 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at
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heavily concentrate on activities of their own government or
military. Therefore, domestic courts would be familiar with all the
parties. However, there are also several problems in relying on
domestic courts for judicial review.
The most problematic aspect of judicial review by domestic

courts is the potential for inconsistent outcomes concerning U.N.
media rules. In nations where the media and freedom of speech
are not highly valued, the United Nations will enjoy considerable
deference to its application of the media rules. However, in
nations like the United States where freedom of speech Is
constitutionally protected, the media may have the greater
advantage. The domestic perspective of the media may transform
the U.N. media rules from consistent guidelines to arbitrary
decisions.
An additional problem with domestic judicial review consists
of a conflicts of law problem. The domestic court would have to
reconcile U.N. media rules with any domestic law concerning its
own media. For instance, a U.S. court may have to consider the
First Amendment as well as the international or U.N. norm
concerning freedom of speech.
This may not only invite
inconsistent applications of U.N. media rules, but may also prove
to be an impossible task.
b. International Court of Justice
The I.C.J. is "the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations. ' 2 28 The I.C.J. has jurisdiction over "all cases which the
parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in
force."2 2 9 Although the Statute of the International Court of
Justice provides that only states may be parties in cases before

the I.C.J., 23 0 the I.C.J. in an advisory opinion 23 1 held that the

2 32
United Nations may be party to a suit before it.
Arguably then, a state could espouse a claim on behalf of a
media organization against the United Nations, challenging the

228. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
229. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36,para. 1.
230. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 34, para. 1.
231. "The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the
International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question."
U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 1. Advisory opinions are non.binding, but provide
guidelines for international behavior.
232. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 187 (April 11) (holding that the United Nations has the capacity to

bring an international claim against a member state for damages to the United
Nations caused by that member's breach of an international obligation to the United
Nations).
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application of U.N. media rules. An action before the I.C.J. would
avoid the inconsistency or conflicts of law problem confronting
domestic courts. In fact, ability of the I.C.J. to apply the singular
standard of international norms, as well as the fact that the I.C.J.
is probably more well-versed on such norms than domestic
courts, would promote greater consistency in the outcome of such
cases.
However, the problem of inadequate claims would hinder the
effectiveness of judicial review by the I.C.J. Because individuals
and media organizations cannot bring claims before the I.C.J., the

state of national origin of the individual reporter or media
organization would have to espouse the claim. In all likelihood,
the state will have endorsed the application of U.N. media rules as
that state's military is likely to be involved in the peacekeeping
operation. Therefore, it is unlikely that the state will challenge
U.N. media rules when the rules are for the security of that state's
troops, or more generally, that state's success in the operation
from which the rule is promulgated. Thus, the media would have
no course of redress for overregulation by the United Nations.
While the enforcement of U.N. media rules may be
problematic, particularly the difficulty in checking U.N.
discretionary power to apply those rules, the merits of U.N. media
rules during peacekeeping operations warrant an attempt to
develop and implement such rules. By promoting open media
coverage except when operational security or success is
jeopardized, U.N. media rules can create a cooperative
atmosphere between peacekeeping forces and the media and allow
for both the interests of the United Nations and the media to be
served.

VII. CONCLUSION

"[Pleacekeeping is beginning to form a core function of the
United Nations in the fields of international peace and security,
23 3
self-determination, human rights, and economic development.

While U.N. peacekeeping serves such vital international interests,
the legitimacy of U.N. peacekeeping still depends upon the
success of each operation.
Thus, in order to preserve the
effectiveness of the United Nations in pursuing these
international interests, U.N. peacekeeping efforts should not be
compromised. However, even though overexposure or inadvertent
reports by the media may compromise the operational security of
peacekeeping operations, it is important that the media keep the
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international public informed. The media's role as a source of
information is particularly important when lives and national, as
well as international, interests are at stake. U.N. media rules that
balance the respective roles of the United Nations and the media
in the peacekeeping context promote cooperation and
understanding, allowing the United Nations to better manage an

operation towards success and the media to better inform the
public as to the progress toward that success.
Jennffer Lee

